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Abstract
This essay introduces Harvey Brown and Oliver Pooley’s ‘dynamical approach’
to special relativity and argues that it is best construed as a relationalist form
of Einstein’s ‘practical geometry’, according to which Minkowski geometrical
structure supervenes upon the symmetries of the best-systems dynamical
laws for a material world with primitive topological or differentiable structure.
This construal of the dynamical approach is shown to be compatible with
the related chapters of Brown’s text, as well as recent descriptions of the
dynamical approach by Pooley and others.
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1 An Introduction to the Dynamical Approach
In Physical Relativity (2005), Harvey Brown promotes an unorthodox interpretation
of special relativity, which shall be referred to here as the ‘dynamical approach’.1
In brief, the dynamical approach argues for the priority of dynamics over geometry
in the context of explanation. Relativistic kinematical phenomena like length
contraction and time dilation, along with inertial motion and even Minkowski
geometrical structure, are to be explained by the fact that the dynamical laws
governing the behavior of material objects are Lorentz-covariant.2 In addition to
these explanatory claims, it has been pointed out by others that if the symmetries
of the dynamical laws are to somehow explain Minkowski geometry, then there
is also an implicit ontological claim being made. Indeed, this ontological claim
is evident in the title of Brown’s collaboration with Oliver Pooley: Minkowski
Space-Time, a Glorious Non-Entity (2006). That is, while the primary focus of
Brown’s work is not the ontological status of spacetime, the dynamical approach to
1In an earlier collaboration with Pooley (Brown and Pooley 2001), the dynamical
approach was introduced as ‘the truncated Lorentzian pedagogy’. This and their
later collaboration (2006) are subsumed in Brown’s Physical Relativity (2005). For
simplicity, I refer primarily to Brown, and quote primarily from Physical Relativity,
when introducing their collaborative promotion of the dynamical approach.
2See Physical Relativity (pp.vii–viii, pp.24–5, ch.8). Note that Brown and Pooley
distinguish the dynamical approach from a ‘fully constructive’ theory, which would
offer explanations that appeal to the details, rather than to the symmetries, of
the dynamical laws (2006, p.82). They also distinguish it from a neo-Lorentzian
approach, which would advocate the existence of a preferred frame (2001, p.257).
relativity is arguably best construed as a form of relationalism, according to which
spacetime does not exist primitively. For otherwise, it could not be said that the
symmetries of the dynamical laws somehow account for its geometrical structure.3
But more importantly, it should also be pointed out that this explanatory claim
comes with an implicit ideological claim: that material objects’ primitive properties
do not constitute a Minkowskian geometrical structure.4 For instance, according
to the dynamical approach, material objects cannot stand, primitively, in the
same chronometric relations that they would if existing in substantival Minkowski
spacetime. Otherwise, it could not be said that the symmetries of the dynamical
laws somehow account for the material world’s Minkowskian geometrical structure.
Rather, the latter would be constituted by the fundamental entities’ primitive
chronometric relations; the fundamental entities would instantiate Minkowski
geometry on their own. This would not do for the dynamical approach, which
describes that geometrical structure as “parasitic on the relativistic properties of
3As mentioned below, Pooley describes the dynamical approach as a form of
relationalism in later work (2013, §6.3.2). However, so long as kinematical effects
and inertial motion are explained by an appeal to the symmetries of the dynamical
laws (rather than those of spacetime), the dynamical approach would actually be
compatible with a form of substantivalism according to which spacetime has less
geometrical structure than that which best codifies the behavior of material objects.
This is addressed further in footnote 23.
4Following Quine (1951), the ontology lists the entities to whose existence the
theory is committed, and the ideology lists those entities’ primitive properties or
relations.
the dynamical matter fields” and as “no more than a codification of the behavior of
rods and clocks” (Brown 2005, p.9, p.100).5,6 Thus of the three explanatory claims
listed above, the idea that dynamics explains geometry is what first associates
the dynamical approach with relationalism, and that also illustrates the difference
between the dynamical approach and a more ‘traditional’ relationalist approach: in
the latter, the material world’s spatiotemporal geometry is constituted by material
objects’ primitive properties; in the former, it supervenes upon the symmetries of
the dynamical laws.7
5See also (Brown 2005, ch.8), especially pp.142–3.
6Note that Brown is not idealizing rods and clocks as privileged entities in
the way Einstein did (1905) and later regretted (1949a, pp.59–61). Rather, Brown
understands rods and clocks to be atomic (or field) configurations governed by
Lorentz-covariant dynamical laws (2005, p.4). That is, he takes them to be solutions
of the dynamical equations, and he takes the equations’ Lorentz-covariance to
ensure that the behavior of rods and clocks is encoded by Minkowski geometry.
7The viability of such a ‘traditional’ relationalist approach to Minkowski space-
time structure is explored by Earman (1989, §6.10), Maudlin (1993, §5), and Pooley
(2013, §6.1; 2014, §5).
2 Ideological Relationalism
and the Constructive Project
The dynamical approach has received a number of responses in the literature. For the
most part, these have focused on the explanatory claims mentioned above.8 Some,
however, have focused primarily upon the implicit ontological claim mentioned
above.9 Insofar as the two can be decoupled, this essay will focus primarily upon
the latter, with an emphasis on the aforementioned ideological claim.
The question at hand is this: if Minkowskian geometrical structure is to super-
vene upon the behavior of material objects that act in accord with Lorentz-covariant
dynamical laws, then in what kind of primitive spatiotemporal relations could
those material objects stand, or what kind of primitive spatiotemporal structure
could they instantiate? From just the brief description above, it should be clear
that chronometric ‘interval’ relations cannot feature in the list of material objects’
primitive properties (i.e. in the ‘ideology’). Similarly, because the causal structure
of Minkowski geometry determines its metrical structure up to scale, causal rela-
tions are also banned from the ideology.10 Thus the dynamical approach must be
8For example: Balashov and Janssen (2003); Janssen (2009); Dieks (2009);
Dorato and Felline (2010); Felline (2011); Frisch (2011); Lange (2011); van Camp
(2011). Many of these (among others) also focus upon Einstein’s claims about the
difference in explanatory power of ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories.
9The implicit ontological claim is acknowledged by Huggett (2009) and by
Pooley (2013). It is emphasized by Nerlich (2013), and especially by Norton (2008).
10Earlier work on this by Robb (1914; 1936) and Zeeman (1964) is brought
together nicely by Winnie (1977).
what might be called an ontologically and ideologically relationalist approach to
Minkowski geometry: it must provide a material ontology that excludes Minkowski
spacetime, and it must provide a spatiotemporally scant ideology, the spatiotempo-
ral components of which do not constitute Minkowski geometry. Then, with respect
to some such metaphysics, it must be shown that Minkowski geometry is derivative
of facts about the symmetries of the dynamical laws.
This ideologically relationalist aspect of the dynamical approach is what has led
some to refer to it as ‘constructive relativity’. In recent work, John Norton describes
the ‘constructivist project’ as the task of inferring Minkowski geometry “from the
properties of matter without recourse to spatiotemporal presumptions or with few
of them” (2008, p.821). And the key word here is “few”, for the explanatory claims
of the dynamical approach certainly do not require that all geometrical structures
or concepts supervene upon the symmetries of the dynamical laws. As Pooley has
recently noted, “the project was to reduce chronogeometric facts to symmetries, not
to recover the entire spatiotemporal nature of the world from no spatiotemporal
assumptions whatsoever” (2013, p.573). And so, what the constructivist project
actually involves is the specification of some primitive spatiotemporal structure
which, while not constituting Minkowski geometry itself, could somehow support
the use of Lorentz-covariant laws in systematizing material objects’ degrees of
freedom. This would seem to require that the dynamical laws be written in terms
of more geometrical structure than is ascribed as primitive of the material world,
and it will be argued below that this commitment gives the dynamical approach a
unique position in the empiricist–conventionalist spectrum of traditional approaches
to geometrical structure.
To begin, Einstein’s well-known contrast between empiricism and convention-
alism is outlined in §3, and what appear to be his own views are distinguished
from the former two in §4. It is then argued in §5 that the dynamical approach
is best understood as an adaptation of Einstein’s perspective, according to which
Minkowski geometry supervenes upon the behavior of rods and clocks.
3 Einstein’s 1921 Geometry and Experience
The idea that spacetime geometry is an empirical issue, and that it should therefore
be described as a branch of physics, was popularized by Einstein in a lecture before
the Prussian Academy of Sciences, which was published under the title Geometry
and Experience in the same year (1921). In the opening paragraphs, Einstein makes
an important distinction between what he calls ‘pure’ or ‘axiomatic’ geometry and
‘practical’ geometry.11 The former is Einstein’s name for the formal, axiomatic
mathematics itself, which consists of primitive terms that are defined implicitly by
the axioms they satisfy.12
[Pure] geometry treats of objects which are denoted by the words
straight line, point, etc. No knowledge or intuition of these objects
is assumed, but only the validity of the axioms, [...] which are to be
taken in a purely formal sense, i.e. as void of all content of intuition or
11Einstein makes the same distinction elsewhere (1925). Carl Hempel also gives a
similar introduction (1945). Note that some authors call the former ‘mathematical’
geometry, and the latter ‘physical’ or ‘applied’ or ‘empirical’ geometry.
12It should be noted that this understanding of geometry comes originally from
David Hilbert (1971).
experience. (1921, p.234)
On this view, pure geometry can make no empirical claims. Instead, its value lies
in the certainty of its mathematical claims.
Practical geometry, on the other hand, is what results from making some
coordination between material objects and the primitive terms of pure geometry.
With some such coordination in place, the logical deductions of pure geometry can
be translated into hypotheses about the behavior of material objects. In this way,
spacetime geometry becomes a branch of physics.
It is clear that the system of concepts of axiomatic geometry alone
cannot make any assertions as to the behavior of real objects of this
kind, which we will call practically-rigid bodies. To be able to make
such assertions, geometry must be stripped of its merely logical-formal
character by the coordination of real objects of experience with the
empty conceptual schema of axiomatic geometry. To accomplish this,
we need only add the proposition: solid bodies are related, with respect
to their possible dispositions, as are bodies in Euclidean geometry of
three dimensions. Then the propositions of Euclid contain affirmations
as to the behavior of practically-rigid bodies. [...] The question whether
the practical geometry of the universe is Euclidean or not has a clear
meaning, and its answer can only be furnished by experience.
(1921, pp.234–5)
However, the price of some such coordination is that the certainty of pure geometry
is lost in the applied, practical geometry; the same experience that provides answers
to the question of the material world’s geometrical structure is also what spoils the
purity of those answers. Hence Einstein’s claim that “as far as the propositions of
mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain,
they do not refer to reality” (p.233).
Now, Einstein’s purposes in making the distinction are clear: it comes as part
of his response to a certain epistemological question about geometry—namely, the
question of whether geometry can provide us with synthetic a priori knowledge.
At the time of Einstein’s writing, advocates of the neo-Kantian tradition held that
it could, and Einstein’s response has typically been taken as illustrating his ties
with logical positivism. For until some coordinations are made between the pure
geometrical primitives and the material world, ‘pure’ geometry itself provides no
information about the material world.13
Whatever Einstein’s position on the epistemic question, he has emphasized more
than once that without this conception of geometry, he could not have developed
general relativity (1921, p.235).14 But the fact that Einstein found it so useful does
not make it uncontroversial. Later in the same article, Einstein goes on to introduce
a rival, conventionalist view of geometry, which is best known by its promotion in
the work of Henri Poincaré (1898; 1905). In short, Poincaré rejects the coordination
of pure geometry’s primitive terms with material objects, and his reasons are
clear: Einstein’s coordination involves rigid bodies, of which there are none. Any
potential candidates—Einstein refers to “measuring lines, measuring wands, etc.”
as examples (p.234)—are subject to conditions like temperature and pressure, to
a degree that would be specified by a theory of matter. What’s more, even when
those influences are accounted for by a matter theory, any talk of rigidity would be
13Friedman (2002), Giovanelli (2012), and Howard (2014) discuss this further.
14See also the references provided by Friedman (2002, p.207ff.).
made in relation to some geometry, meaning that a geometrical structure would
have been assumed already. As Einstein explains, Poincaré’s denial of the necessary
coordination eliminates the possibility of ‘practical’ geometry at all, and leads to
the view that spacetime geometry is not an empirical issue, but a conventional one
(p.236ff.). And were the choice up to him, Poincaré would prefer to use Euclidean
geometry over anything more complicated or unfamiliar.
4 On Rigid Bodies and Practical Geometry
At this point, Einstein has presented two incompatible perspectives on geometrical
structure. Given his testimony about the usefulness of ‘practical geometry’, it would
seem that he takes the empiricists’ side.15 But in the same paper, Einstein admits
to taking sides with Poincaré, at least in principle.
Sub specie aeterni Poincaré, in my opinion, is right. The idea of the
measuring-rod and the idea of the clock coordinated with it in the
theory of relativity do not find their exact correspondence in the real
world. It is also clear that the solid body and the clock do not in the
conceptual edifice of physics play the part of irreducible elements, but
15Einstein made similar claims when writing on the same topic in the years
immediately following (1924; 1925), and later attributed the position to Hans
Reichenbach (1949b, p.679). Indeed, the empiricist approach that Einstein advocates
above is very much in line with that of Reichenbach (1949; 1958), whose use of
‘coordinative definitions’ establishes a link between ‘axiomatic’ and ‘empirical’
geometry. Closer comparisons are offered by Giovanelli (2012) and Howard (2014).
that of composite structures, which must not play any independent part
in theoretical physics. [...] But it is my conviction that in the present
stage of development of theoretical physics these concepts must still be
employed as independent concepts; for we are still far from possessing
such certain knowledge of the theoretical principles of atomic structure
as to be able to construct solid bodies and clocks theoretically from
elementary concepts.
(1921, pp.236–7; cf. 1949b, pp.676–9)
Taking this statement into consideration, it would seem that Einstein, while fully
endorsing the methodology of ‘practical geometry’, would abstain from committing
himself to the existence of rigid bodies. But of course, to do so would be to
deny that geometrical structure is in fact a branch of science. Recognizing this,
Einstein follows the quotation above with a clarification that the physical state
of a measuring body can always be determined “so accurately that its behavior
relative to other measuring-bodies shall be sufficiently free from ambiguity to allow
it to be substituted for the ‘rigid’ body”, and that “it is to measuring-bodies of
this kind that statements about rigid bodies must be referred” (1921, p.237). So
long as these ‘practically’ rigid bodies are taken to exist, Einstein would still view
geometry as something to be determined empirically. But to go any further in
denying the existence of rigid bodies would lead to a very different perspective.
In another popular-level article on a similar topic, Einstein expounds upon this
point.16
16Another translation is given by Howard (2014, p.20). Einstein also makes a
very similar point elsewhere (1925).
The stance on these theses depends on whether one grants reality to
practical rigid bodies. If yes, then the concept of distance corresponds
to something experienceable. Geometry then contains statements about
possible experiments; it is a physical science directly subject to experi-
mental proof (standpoint A). If no reality is conceded to practical rigid
measurable bodies, the geometry alone holds no statements about expe-
riences (experiments), rather just geometry together with the physical
sciences (standpoint B). Physics has hitherto always used the simpler
standpoint A and largely owes to it its productivity; it uses it in all
its measurements. [...] If, however, one assumes standpoint B, which
at the current state of science should be regarded as exaggeratedly
cautious, then geometry on its own is not experimentally testable. Then
geometrical measurements don’t exist at all. [...]
Seen from standpoint B, the selection of geometric concepts and
relations is determined only for reasons of simplicity and practicality.
Under no condition does the choice of a non-Euclidean geometry presup-
pose Euclidean geometry as its basis. But then nothing can be discerned
empirically about the dimensions of the space, but not because “space
is not real,” rather because with this choice of standpoint geometry is
not a complete physical system of concepts but only part of one.
(1924, p.202)
Now, in order to make sense of Einstein’s claim that standpoint B should be
regarded as “exaggeratedly cautious,” it should be kept in mind that standpoint A
does not involve a commitment to the existence of rigid bodies, but only practically
rigid bodies. Thus standpoint A is effectively Einstein’s position, even after agreeing
with Poincaré in principle, as outlined in his 1921 lecture. But here a clarification is
in order: by granting existence only to practically rigid bodies, Einstein’s ‘practical
geometry’ loses at least some of its punch. In that case, it could not be said that the
primitive geometrical structure of the material world can be determined empirically,
but merely that, to good approximation, material objects behave in accord with
some particular geometrical structure.
5 Practical, Supervenient Geometry
We now return to the question of where the dynamical approach could fit into
the empiricist–conventionalist divide. To begin, it should be pointed out that if
emphasis is placed on the explanatory claims of the dynamical approach, then
one might be led to think that Brown is advocating empiricism. Along these lines,
Bradford Skow shows us how far the comparison could be taken.
Maybe Brown thinks that the symmetries of the laws explain why
spacetime has the structure it does because the spacetime metric is
somehow analyzed in terms of the laws. In several places his discussion
suggests that, on his view, a field only gets to be the metric field when
the dynamics prescribe that material bodies behave in the right sort of
way with respect to it (see, for example, pages 100 and 160). Compare
this to a Reichenbachian view according to which distance between
points of space is analyzed in terms of the behavior of measuring
rods—though Brown rejects this view (23), his view does seem to
resemble it: both of them make spacetime geometry an extrinsic matter.
(Brown’s apparent denial that spacetime geometry is “self-standing”
and “autonomous” looks like a denial that it is intrinsic (143).)
(2006, p.4)
As Skow notes, Brown seems to reject the ‘practical geometry’ approach in its
strongest form, according to which the existence of rigid bodies paves the way for
the world’s primitive geometry to be determined empirically. After all, Brown is
careful to treat rods and clocks as complex entities governed by dynamics, and not
as privileged entities that could play a role in the coordination process outlined
above.17 Indeed, given Brown’s emphasis on Einstein’s misgivings about privileging
rods and clocks in the development of special (and general) relativity, his work
might even be taken as supportive of Poincaré’s conventionalism—but for the fact
that Brown advocates Minkowskian rather than Euclidean geometry, and speaks
freely about the symmetries of dynamical laws without assuming some geometrical
structure first.
Thus Brown’s work cannot easily be read as a support of either ‘ism’ outlined
in §3. And nor should it. The strict empiricist perspective would not support the
explanatory claim in which symmetries of the dynamical laws account for Minkowski
geometry, but only that those symmetries can reveal to us the world’s primitive
spatiotemporal structure. And already it has been explained that the dynamical
approach is not compatible with an ideology in which Minkowski geometrical
structure is taken as primitive. On the other hand, Poincaré’s conventionalist
approach would require an argument in favor of Minkowski geometry on the basis
of its simplicity relative to other geometrical structures. And even if such an
argument could be made, it would get us nowhere in accounting for that geometry
17See earlier comments in footnote 6, above.
by appealing to the symmetries of dynamical laws. Instead, the dynamical approach
seems to land much closer to Einstein’s own views, according to which truly rigid
bodies are not assumed, and yet the behavior of material bodies plays a substantive
role in arriving at some particular spacetime structure. The crucial difference, of
course, is that the dynamical approach’s arrow of explanation from dynamics to
geometry would require that the geometrical structure determined by the methods
of ‘practical geometry’ should not be taken as a primitive feature of the world, but
as somehow supervening upon the behavior of material objects themselves.
To see how such a project might succeed, recall from above (§2) that the
dynamical approach is not prohibited from assuming some kind of sub-metrical
spatiotemporal structure, so long as the full structure of Minkowski spacetime is
still somehow picked out by the symmetries of the dynamical laws. Although the
technical details of such an approach are beyond the scope of this paper, the general
scheme could be completed by taking a particular Humean conception of natural
laws, according to which regularities in the ‘Humean mosaic’ may be described
with the aid of more geometrical structure than is actually present in the mosaic.18
And if, for a particular Humean mosaic, the best-systems dynamical laws are in
fact written in terms of some such supplementary geometrical structure, then that
structure would supervene upon the symmetries of the dynamical laws. To put
it in other words, a material system with sub-metrical spatiotemporal structure
could always be labeled by sets of coordinates that are related to one another
by transformations corresponding to the symmetry group of a richer geometrical
18This ‘liberalized’ Humean conception of dynamical laws is introduced by
Huggett (2006), and is discussed further in §7 below.
structure. And if some such set of coordinatizations are the ones with respect
to which the best-systems dynamical laws are written, then that set is used in
determining the mosaic’s supervenient geometrical structure.
In this way, a world in which rigid bodies clearly do not exist is still a world
in which the methods of Einstein’s practical geometry can be applied. In the
process, the dynamical approach’s arrow of explanation from dynamics to geometry
is vindicated: the primitive spatiotemporal structure of the material world is
sub-metrical, while Minkowski geometry supervenes upon the symmetries of the
best-system dynamical laws.
6 Brown’s Coordinatization Project
In the opening of the second chapter of Physical Relativity, Brown raises a question
that occupies his attention for the remainder of that section:
It is common in discussions of the principle of general covariance in
Einstein’s general theory of relativity to find the claim that coordinates
assigned to events are merely labels. [...] Before we consider labeling
them, what physically distinguishes two different events of exactly the
same kind? (2005, p.11)
Brown’s response reveals that he has in mind an ontology of physical fields with
some kind of sub-metrical structure.
Brown begins his response by casting doubt upon the existence of points of
substantival spacetime. He reviews Robert Geroch’s (1978) distinction between a
localized ‘material event’—like a firecracker or finger-snapping, and which Brown
calls a physical ‘marker’—and the point of spacetime in/at which the event is
taken to occur in a substantivalist perspective. And whereas Geroch was allegedly
hesitant to make a distinction between the ‘point’ and its ‘marker’, Brown is clear in
stating that he does not distinguish the two at all. That is, Brown is not interested
in the relationships between points of spacetime, but rather in the relationships
between their markers. Thus an ontological relationalism is suggested, even if
it is not crucial to Brown’s thesis.19 And in the place of substantival spacetime
points, Brown suggests a fundamental ontology of ‘markers’ (material events) that
comprise coincident values of physical fields.20
Then, Brown’s ideology is revealed by his approach to distinguishing such
material events for the purposes of coordinatization.21 As Brown explains, there
will surely exist various types of material events that are intrinsically indiscernible
(2005, p.13). And at this point, Brown finds himself in a more difficult situation
than the traditional relationalist. If Brown were to admit Minkowski intervals
as primitive relations between material events, then indistinguishable material
events would not be an issue for any but the most unrealistically homogeneous
or symmetric universes. Rather, the possible coordinatizations would be fixed by
the requirement that they respect the structural properties that supervene upon
the field values’ spatiotemporal relations.22 But so far, Brown has only admitted
19See footnotes 3 and 23.
20See (Brown 2005, p.13). This is consistent with what Brown has written
elsewhere (1997, p.68). A similar point has been made by Pooley (2014, §5.8).
21In the spirit of the physicists to whom Brown refers, I refer to Geroch’s events
as ‘points of substantival spacetime’ and to their markers as ‘material events’.
22See (Pooley 2014, §5.8) for a discussion.
material events, and in order to justify any particular choice of coordinatization,
he must begin to build up an appropriately rich spatiotemporal ideology without
undermining the goal of accounting for metrical structure in terms of the symmetries
of dynamical laws.
Toward that end, Brown argues that each individual material event stands in
a unique relationship to the universe as a whole. That is, material events “have
different coordinates because they are distinct, and they are distinct not in virtue of
what they are locally but in virtue of the fact that they stand in different relations
to the rest of the universe—to the rest of the markers” (p.14). To illustrate, Brown
borrows a phrase from Julian Barbour (1982).
Minkowski, Einstein, and Weyl invite us to take a microscopic look,
as it were, for little featureless grains of sand, which, closely packed,
make up space-time. But Leibniz and Mach suggest that if we want
to get a true idea of what a point of space-time is like we should look
outward at the universe, not inward into some supposed amorphous
treacle called the space-time manifold. The complete notion of a point
of space-time in fact consists of the appearance of the entire universe
as seen from that point. Copernicus did not convince people that the
earth was moving by getting them to examine the earth but rather the
heavens. Similarly, the reality of different points of space-time rests
ultimately on the existence of different (coherently related) viewpoints
of the universe as a whole. (Brown 2005, p.14)
Of course, Barbour’s description is easy enough to understand when material events
are taken to have some kind of (pseudo-)metrical structure. But what sense can
be made of it if some such structure cannot be assumed, so that it remains to be
accounted for by the symmetries of the dynamical laws? Granted, questions of this
sort aren’t Brown’s primary focus, but it is clear that Brown must be assuming at
least some kind of primitive ordering or arrangement to the world’s material events.
Indeed, it is as if Brown’s material events have all the sub-metrical continuity
structure of a differentiable manifold, but not any metrical structure. Thus it would
be fair to say that Brown’s fundamental metaphysics seems to be a collection of
material events with some particular topological, or perhaps even differentiable
structure. And in fact, Norton cites personal correspondence that supports this.
In the process of the refereeing of an earlier version of this note, Harvey
Brown has assured me that (Brown and Pooley 2006) and (Brown
2005, especially ch.2) presumed the existence of a manifold of spacetime
events with coordinate systems. (2008, p.829)
From this we see that Pooley’s reminder above (p.5) is apt: the dynamical
approach to special relativity needn’t account for all geometrical structure by an
appeal to the symmetries of the dynamical laws, and indeed Brown seems to have
had in mind a primitive sub-metrical structure all along. The dynamical approach’s
arrow of explanation from dynamics to geometry can then be understood along the
lines above: as an application of Einstein’s practical geometry to a topological (or
differentiable) space of field values, which finds Minkowski geometry to supervene
upon the symmetries of the best-system dynamical laws.
7 Conclusions
In the sections above, it has been argued that the dynamical approach to special
relativity involves explicit explanatory claims—as well as implicit ontological and
ideological claims—that give it a unique position in the spectrum of traditional
approaches to spacetime geometry. The explanatory, ontological, and ideological
claims can be satisfied when a primitive sub-metrical structure is ascribed to
material bodies in such a way that, given the range of coordinatizations respecting
that sub-metrical structure, the set in terms of which are written the best-system
dynamical laws are related to one another by elements of the Poincaré group.23
If fact, this form of practical geometry has appeared in recent commentaries on
Brown’s work. For example, it was mentioned above that Norton acknowledges the
possibility of taking a topologically structured spacetime as primitive, although
no comments are made as to whether that topological structure could instead be
assigned to the material objects themselves.24 A similar suggestion has also been
made by Nick Huggett.
One possibility is that unlike geometry, topology is fundamental [...
The] topology of the fields plus point coincidences do not determine
the metrical properties, so there is additional work to be done by the
laws, along the lines sketched above. (2009, p.418)
23Following on from footnote 3, the dynamical approach would also be compati-
ble with a form of ontological substantivalism, according to which there exists a
substantival spacetime manifold with sub-metrical structure, from which the inhab-
iting material objects inherit their own. Minkowski geometry could still supervene
along the lines above. Some of Brown’s claims about geometry appear open to
interpretation along these lines (Brown 2005, p.9, p.100, p.133, p.142), although
there is nothing to suggest that Brown actually has this in mind.
24See also (2008, p.833).
And more recently, Oliver Pooley has suggested something similar (2013, §6.3.2;
2014, §6.2). The common idea is that the constructivist project can be carried
out by considering a material world with sub-metrical spatiotemporal structure,
and allowing the best-systems dynamical laws to be written in terms of some
geometrical structure that supervenes upon those laws’ being best.
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